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Acknowledgements
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3
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1.
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Introduction
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7
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1.1
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Why the capability approach?
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7
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1.2
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The worries of the sceptics
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10
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1.3
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A yardstick for the evaluation of prosperity and progress
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11
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1.4
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Scope and development of the capability approach
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16
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1.5
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A guide for the reader
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19
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2.
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Core Ideas and the Framework
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21
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2.1
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Introduction
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21
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2.2
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A preliminary definition of the capability approach
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23
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2.3
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The capability approach versus capability theories
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29
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2.4
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The many modes of capability analysis
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31
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2.5
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The modular view of the capability approach
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36
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2.6
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The A-module: the non-optional core of all capability theories
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38
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2.6.1
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A1: Functionings and capabilities
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38
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2.6.2
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A2: Functionings and capabilities are value-neutral categories
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41
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2.6.3
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A3: Conversion factors
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45
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2.6.4
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A4: The means-ends distinction
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47
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2.6.5
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A5: Functionings and capabilities as the evaluative space
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51
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2.6.6
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A6: Other dimensions of ultimate value
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53
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2.6.7
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A7: Value pluralism
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55
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2.6.8
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A8: The principle of each person as an end
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57
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2.7
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The B-modules: non-optional modules with optional content
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59
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2.7.1
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B1: The purpose of the capability theory
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60
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2.7.2
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B2: The selection of dimensions
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61
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2.7.3
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B3: Human diversity
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63
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2.7.4
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B4: Agency
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63
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2.7.5
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B5: Structural constraints
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65
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2.7.6
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B6: The choice between functionings, capabilities, or both
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66
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2.7.7
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B7: Meta-theoretical commitments
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67
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2.8
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The C-modules: contingent modules
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67
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2.8.1
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C1: Additional ontological and explanatory theories
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68
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2.8.2
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C2: Weighing dimensions
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69
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2.8.3
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C3: Methods for empirical analysis
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72
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2.8.4
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C4: Additional normative principles and concerns
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73
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2.9
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The modular view of the capability account: a summary
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73
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2.10
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Hybrid theories
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75
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2.11
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The relevance and implications of the modular view
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77
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2.12
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A visualisation of the core conceptual elements
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80
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2.13
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The narrow and broad uses of the capability approach
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84
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2.14
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Conclusion
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87
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3.
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Clarifications
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89
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3.1
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Introduction
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89
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3.2
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Refining the notions of ‘capability’ and ‘functioning’
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90
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3.2.1
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Capability as an opportunity versus capability as an opportunity set
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91
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3.2.2
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Nussbaum’s terminology
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92
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3.2.3
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What are ‘basic capabilities’?
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94
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3.2.4
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Conceptual and terminological refinements
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96
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3.3
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Are capabilities freedoms, and if so, which ones?
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98
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3.3.1
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Capabilities as positive freedoms?
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99
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3.3.2
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Capabilities as opportunity or option freedoms?
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102
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3.3.3
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Are capabilities best understood as freedoms?
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106
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3.4
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Functionings or capabilities?
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107
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3.5
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Human diversity in the capability approach
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113
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3.6
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Collective capabilities
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115
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3.7
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Which notion of wellbeing is used in the capability approach?
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118
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3.7.1
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The aim and context of accounts of wellbeing
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119
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3.7.2
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The standard taxonomy of philosophical wellbeing accounts
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121
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3.7.3
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The accounts of wellbeing in the capability approach
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125
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3.8
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Happiness and the capability approach
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126
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3.8.1
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What is the happiness approach?
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127
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3.8.2
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The ontological objection
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129
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3.8.3
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Mental adaptation and social comparisons
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130
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3.8.4
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Comparing groups
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133
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3.8.5
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Macro analysis
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134
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3.8.6
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The place of happiness in the capability approach
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135
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3.9
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The capability approach and adaptive preferences
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137
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3.10
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Can the capability approach be an explanatory theory?
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142
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3.11
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A suitable theory for all normative questions?
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143
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3.12
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The role of resources in the capability approach
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145
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3.13
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The capability approach and theories of justice
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147
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3.13.1
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A brief description of the literature on theories of justice
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148
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3.13.2
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What do we need for a capability theory of justice?
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153
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3.13.3
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From theories of justice to just practices and policies
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158
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3.14
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Capabilities and human rights
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160
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3.14.1
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What are human rights?
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161
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3.14.2
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The interdisciplinary scholarship on human rights
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162
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3.14.3
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Why a capability-based account of human rights?
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164
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3.14.4
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Are capabilities sufficient to construct a theory of human rights?
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166
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3.14.5
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The disadvantages
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167
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3.15
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Conclusion
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168
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4.
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Critiques and Debates
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169
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4.1
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Introduction
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169
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4.2
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Is everything that’s called a capability genuinely a capability?
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170
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4.3
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Should we commit to a specific list of capabilities?
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171
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4.4
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Why not use the notion of needs?
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174
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4.5
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Does the capability approach only address the government?
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179
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4.6
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Is the capability approach too individualistic?
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183
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4.6.1
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Different forms of individualism
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184
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4.6.2
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Does the capability approach pay sufficient attention to groups?
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186
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4.6.3
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Social structures, norms and institutions in the capability approach
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188
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4.7
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What about power and political economy?
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190
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4.7.1
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Which account of power and choice?
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190
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4.7.2
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Should we prioritise analysing the political economy?
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193
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4.8
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Is the capability approach a liberal theory?
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194
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4.9
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Why ‘human development’ is not the same idea
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197
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4.10
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Can the capability approach change welfare economics?
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202
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4.10.1
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Welfare economics and the economics discipline
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203
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4.10.2
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Non-welfarism
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204
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4.10.3
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Empirical possibilities and challenges
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207
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4.10.4
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Towards a heterodox capabilitarian welfare economics?
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208
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4.11
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Taking stock
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210
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5.
|
Which Future for the Capability Approach?
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211
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References
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217
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Index
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251
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